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Abstract
The rapid growth of the immigrant population in the U.S., along with changes in the
demographics and the political landscape, has often raised questions for understanding trends of
inequality. Important issues that have received little scholarly attention thus far are excluding
immigrants’ social rights through decisive policy choices and the distributive consequences of
such exclusive policies. In this paper, we examine how immigration and state policies on
immigrants’ access to safety net programs together influence social inequality in the context of
health care. We analyze the combined effect of immigration population density and state
immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules on the gap of Medicaid coverage rates between native- and
foreign-born populations. When tracking inequality in Medicaid coverage and critical policy
changes in the post-PRWORA era, we find that exclusive state policies widen the native-foreign
Medicaid coverage gap. Moreover, the effect of state policies is conditional upon the size of the
immigrant population in that state. Our findings suggest immigrants’ formal integration into the
welfare system is crucial for understanding social inequality in the U.S. states.
KEY WORDS: immigrant welfare eligibility, health care inequality, politics of exclusion

Introduction
The United States stands alone from other industrialized democracies because of its longstanding political struggle over universal health care reforms (Starr, 2011). Among hundreds of
thousands of workers who live without health insurance, America’s newcomers– the immigrant
population–face even more daunting situations. The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, along with the surge of anti-immigration
sentiment among the masses, made it more difficult for immigrants and their children to obtain
health care. According to the Census Bureau, the proportion of the foreign-born population
without health care coverage was more than double the amount of native-born citizens
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Smith, 2011, 25). Immigration status, as Ku and Matani (2001)
substantiate, has become “an important component of racial and ethnic disparities in insurance
coverage and access to care (247).”
The ideological battle on the issue of immigration and immigrants’ access to health care
has its root in divided opinions about how the American democracy should integrate its
newcomers. At the national level, political compartmentalization led to the Clinton welfare
reform and substantial retrenchment of federal responsibility in providing health care to
immigrant families.1 As such, much of the political stake was left to the states’ discretion (Hero
and Preuhs, 2007). The state-level picture, nevertheless, shows mixed promises: a few states
have been successful in pushing forward new generous policies to qualify immigrants for
Medicaid provisions, while others have followed the federal government and tightened their
health care provisions to immigrants. To this end, the health care disparities confronting

1 According to the PRWORA (1996), immigrants entering the US after August 22, 1996 are barred from Medicaid
and most other federal-funded welfare programs for the first five years after their entry. Besides Medicaid,
immigrants are also barred from federal-funded food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) benefits, and services provided through the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG).

immigrants create a major normative dilemma: on the one hand, immigrants are an integral part
of American society; on the other hand, they face more political barriers to being incorporated
into the American welfare system. This normative dilemma has motivated an important research
agenda in welfare state politics that deals with both immigration and social inequality.
Numerous prior studies have examined the relationship between immigration and welfare
policy, much of which focuses on either how attitudes toward ethnic minorities influence public
support for welfare (Gilens, 2000; Hainmuller and Hiscox, 2010; Martin, 2001), or on how
immigration and ethnic diversity influence the generosity of welfare states (Agrawal, 2008;
Borjas, 1999; Hero and Preuhs, 2007; Nannestad, 2007). Research has increasingly theorized that
immigration-induced ethnic diversity is a challenge for sustaining generous welfare states. Yet,
much fewer studies chart the distributive consequences of state policies that define immigrants’
legal access to safety net programs. In this study, we take a different prism by focusing on the
link between immigration, state policies, and social inequality in the context of health care. Our
primary goal is to uncover how states’ policy decisions in welfare inclusion/exclusion of
immigrants influence inequality in health care coverage between immigrants and their nativeborn counterparts, and how such an effect is conditional upon the state environment for
immigrants.
Our exploration of immigrants’ welfare rights and the implications on social inequality
hinges on a political exclusion perspective. We contend that the exclusion of immigrants from
the welfare system at the subnational level enlarges the Medicaid coverage gap between the
native- and foreign-born populations for two reasons. First, states use restrictive eligibility
policies to formally exclude some immigrants from safety-net programs (Ku, 2009a;
Zimmermann and Fix, 1998). Second, exclusive policies create an icy policy environment that

3

sends negative signals about the role of government, thus these policies produce negative social
constructions for targeted populations and closely associated groups (Campbell, 2012; Schneider
and Ingram, 1993; Soss and Schram, 2007) which discourages eligible immigrants from
participating in safety net programs (Fix, 2009). Extending previous studies that only compare
state-level immigrant welfare eligibilities in one year (Hero and Preuhs, 2007; Filindra, 2013),
we offer the first systematic comparison of immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules across states and
multiple years in the post-PRWORA era. We also use immigrant network theory to endorse a
conditional effect of state immigrant welfare policies and the state-level immigrant population
density on social inequality. We contend that the Medicaid coverage gap between immigrants
and their native-born counterparts is larger in states with more exclusive policies, and this
positive relationship between state policy exclusiveness and social inequality is strengthened in
states with lower levels of immigrant population density.
We then empirically examine the combined effects of immigrant population density and
state-level immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules on the native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap.
The state-level panel data analysis shows support for both hypotheses. We find that states with
inclusive Medicaid policies have lower levels of health care inequality than states with exclusive
Medicaid policies. In addition, immigrant population density is also found to condition the
relationship between state policies and disparities in Medicaid coverage. The native-foreign
Medicaid coverage gap is seen as the greatest among those states with a relatively sparser
immigrant population and very exclusive Medicaid policies, yet the gap is negligible in states
with a denser immigrant population and inclusive immigrant Medicaid policies. Our research
suggests that social inequality in the U.S. states cannot be fully understood without considering
the politics of exclusion in policymaking and immigrant social network at the subnational level.
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Immigration, Political Exclusion, and Social Inequality in Health Care
The United States witnessed a substantial increase in immigration in the past few decades.
According to the Census Bureau, in 1970, the United States had a foreign-born population of
approximately 9.5 million; however, the number increased to 38 million in 2007, almost
quadrupling from 1970 (Census 1999; 2007).2 This rapid demographic change coincides with the
rising public concern regarding immigrants’ use of public services, such as education, social
assistance, and health care (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Fix, 2009; Hainmuller and Hiscox, 2010).
Exclusive welfare reforms at both the national and state level restricted immigrants’ access to
government funds that finance health insurance plans for low-income families. As a result, the
gap in health insurance coverage between native- and foreign- born populations continues to
grow (LaVeist, 2005). The nexus between immigration and social inequality in health care
access has recently gained scholarly attention and offered a new basis for studying the
implications of immigration on social equity. Various theoretical frameworks have been
developed to probe the link between immigration and social inequality, and we focus on two—
the politics of exclusion and the immigrant social network.
Political Exclusion through Welfare Reform
A growing body of literature finds that immigration has increased racial and ethnic complexity in
American states and raised new challenges to sustaining generous social policy provisions
(Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Hero, 2010). The increasing race and ethnic diversity may dissolve
social cohesion and reduce the generosity of safety net programs (Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote, 2001; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Hero, 1998; Hero and Tolbert, 1998; Rowthorn,
2 In the United States, an immigrant normally refers to someone who obtains permanent residency. The term
foreign-born population does not only include permanent residents, but also naturalized citizens, temporary legal
foreign-born residents and undocumented immigrants.
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2008; Stichnothe and Van der Straete, 2011). Consistent with this social erosion argument is the
group-competition and political exclusion argument. For example, Esses et al. (2001) assert that
immigration in North America, to a large extent, has triggered perceived threats and groupcompetition among native-born populations. With such a symbolic threat, an in-group (e.g.
native-born citizens) is likely to demand policies that restrict an out-group (e.g. immigrants)
from accessing their material resources.
Indeed, the 1996 federal welfare reform was driven by a wave of strong anti-immigrant
sentiment along with the resurgence of nativism after the passage of Proposition 187 in
California (Agrawal 2008, Alvarez and Butterfield 2000). From 1982 to 1992, the United States
witnessed the number of immigrant applicants for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) double in
size. By 1992, the number of immigrant recipients rose to over 600,000 and accounted for more
than 25% of the total number of recipients (House of Representatives Committee on Ways and
Means, 1998). Both the American public and the federal government were concerned about such
sharp increases in the volume of immigrant welfare recipients, as well as the possibility that
immigrants might “bring in their parents …with the intention of supporting them by taking
advantage of the welfare benefits” (Committee on Ways and Means, 1998, 1398). Facing the
increasing concerns that immigrants’ consumption of social assistance may lead to a slew of
problems threatening the resource pool for low-income citizens, Congress passed the PRWORA
in 1996, which restricted immigrants from receiving federal-funded welfare benefits including
Medicaid in the first five years after their entry. One negative consequence of excluding
immigrants’ welfare rights under the PRWORA is that it led to a substantial reduction in
immigrants’ participation in various safety net programs, including Medicaid. Ku and
Papademtriou (2007) report that, since the enactment of the PRWORA, low-income non-citizens
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have had much lower Medicaid coverage rates than low-income citizens.
The federal-level reform gave states discretion to make complementary state welfare
policies. For example, by using state funds, states can determine (1) whether or not to give legal
immigrants who entered the United States before August 22, 1996 access to Medicaid, (2)
whether or not immigrants who entered the United States after August 22, 1996 are eligible for
Medicaid during the five-year bar, (3) whether or not immigrants who entered the United States
after August 22, 1996 are eligible for Medicaid after the five-year bar, (4) whether or not to
provide Medicaid to unqualified immigrants in the first five years after their entry, and (5)
whether or not to have state funded health insurance programs for immigrants (Bitler and
Hoynes, 2013). States differ in the making of their own immigrant Medicaid policies, with some
strictly following the federal law without providing immigrants with any additional Medicaid
coverage, and others using state funds to provide Medicaid coverage in all five aspects. For
example, ever since 1996, Wyoming has strictly enforced the federal regulations and excluded
immigrants from Medicaid. On the contrary, states like California, Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania decided, immediately after the 1996 PRWORA, that they would use their own state
funds to fund immigrants Medicaid in all of the above-mentioned aspects. Ever since then, they
have been providing Medicaid to immigrants and treating them just like citizens.
More tellingly, exclusive state policies not only disqualify non-eligible immigrants’
access to safety net programs, but also discourage eligible immigrants from participating in
social programs by producing negative policy feedback. Social construction theory (Schneider
and Ingram 1993) suggests that specific public policy designs create positive or negative social
constructions for the targeted populations. Such social constructions can directly influence the
government’s role in providing social welfare, and the targeted population’s behavior of welfare
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participation. For instance, exclusive state policies create an icy policy environment for
immigrants by attaching them with negative social labels, such as “being lazy”, “undeserving”,
and “welfare magnet.” Through such stigmatization, exclusive policies send negative signals
about the role of government in the lives targeted, depressing eligible immigrants’ participation
in these policy programs.
As Hacker (2006) explains, in health care and other social policy areas, government often
hesitates to directly provide social protection to the underclass, which sends “unwelcoming”
signals to those who are negatively socially constructed. Other empirical studies show that
subnational policies that are exclusive (or punitive) toward undocumented immigrants can have
negative policy feedback (Campbell, 2012; Soss and Schram 2007) or the so-called “chilling
effect” (Fix, 2010; Waston, 2014) on eligible immigrants’ participation in safety-net programs.
In their study of health-care services in immigrant communities in five metropolitan counties in
Texas, Hagan et al. (2003) find that many eligible immigrants voluntarily withdrew from
Medicaid after Texas followed the federal welfare reform and initiated exclusive immigrant
eligibility rules for various state safety net programs. Other scholars who study welfare reform
and immigrants’ Medicaid enrollment report a similar “chilling effect” on non-citizens’
Medicaid participation in more than one state (Bilter, Gelbach and Hoynes, 2005; Ellwood and
Ku, 1998; Ku, 2009a). As Ku and Matani (2001, 247) describe, changes in welfare program
eligibility rules constitute “an important component of racial and ethnic disparities in insurance
coverage and access to care.”
In sum, the underlying mechanism of the “chilling effect,” explained by Hook (2003,
614), is that “because of immigrants’ particularly vulnerable legal and social status, the
immigrant-specific provisions of welfare reform may have increased immigrants’ confusion
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about their eligibility for welfare benefits and heightened their distrust of the U.S. government.”
Tightening eligibility is conceptualized as an important source of the icy policy climate for
immigrants (Fix, 2009; Potocky-Pripodi, 2004; Ku, 2009a,b). Considering that exclusive state
welfare policies not only set legal barriers for immigrants’ welfare participation but also cause a
“chilling effect” and depress eligible immigrants’ welfare participation, we expect the nativeforeign difference in Medicaid coverage to be larger in states with exclusive immigrant Medicaid
eligibility rules than that in states with inclusive policies.
H1: States with exclusive immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules have a larger native-foreign
Medicaid coverage gap, and vice versa.
Immigrant Population Density as a Conditional State Context
American states differ from one another in their stocks of immigrants as well as their
immigration flows. Gateways such as California, New York, Florida, and Texas not only
maintain a large foreign-born population, but also saw large amounts of immigration inflows in
recent years. New destination states, such as Alabama, North Carolina and South Carolina,
experienced large influxes of immigrants in the two most recent decades, although their foreignborn population stocks might not be as high. States such as West Virginia, Montana, Wyoming,
Kentucky and Nebraska have exactly the opposite experience in immigration. Not only were
their foreign-born population stocks low, immigration inflows to these states in recent years were
also low. Both the existing immigrant population that resided in a state for a relatively long time
period and the newcomers who arrived to a state recently formed important immigrant networks.
These immigrant networks play an important role in welfare participation through two pathways:
(1) reducing the stigma of welfare participation, and (2) information spillovers (Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch, 1992; Borjas, 1995; Case and Katz, 1991; Ellison and
Fudenberg, 1993, 1995). Simply put, socializing with other immigrant welfare recipients will
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make individuals feel less shameful of taking welfare benefits. Meanwhile, immigrants are more
likely to obtain more information about welfare programs in communities with strong immigrant
social networks than in places where they are isolated.
Information spillovers through immigrants’ social networks provide an important
mechanism for immigrants to learn about welfare programs and eligibility rules. Such a
mechanism is crucial for immigrants’ welfare participation, because it is very common for
immigrants not to know if they are eligible for welfare programs such as Medicaid in their state.
Such blindness is due to a combination of factors. First, state welfare eligibility rules are often
quite complicated and contain multiple aspects that could influence the eligibility of a particular
immigrant. For example, immigration status, age, length of stay, and whether the first entry was
before or after August 22, 1996 could all potentially influence an immigrant’s eligibility for
Medicaid in one way or another. Besides the complexity, eligibility rules also change over time
and vary substantially across states. Many states have changed their immigrant eligibility rules
more than once since 1996. Mastering the knowledge of the eligibility rules and keeping up with
the changes is a challenging job to any immigrant individual. Last but not least, information on
these immigrant welfare eligibility rules, supposedly all public information, is ironically publicly
unavailable in a vast majority of the states. Indeed, we discover in our endeavor of data
collection that few states publicize information on immigrant welfare eligibility rules on a public
web site. We also discover from our email correspondence and phone conversations that officials
in state Medicaid agencies who deal with Medicaid recipients on a daily basis do not always
know the eligibility rules for immigrants in their own state.
The fact that immigrant welfare eligibility rules are complex and relevant public
information is not readily available invites us to consider other factors in the policy-disparity
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mechanism. Even though welfare exclusion of immigrants plays an important role in state level
native-foreign Medicaid coverage gaps, the working of such exclusion should depend upon the
immigrant network. In states with a denser immigrant population, there is a much higher chance
for an average immigrant to use the social network among fellow immigrants to learn about the
eligibility rules and participate in welfare programs. In contrast, in states with a sparse immigrant
population, immigrants struggle to obtain information from a social network of their own about
how to participate in various welfare programs. Imagine if an individual migrates from the
Philippines to the United States and wishes to participate in its welfare programs. Both
California and Alaska have quite generous welfare policies toward immigrants, yet, the Filipino
might have a much better chance to have contacts with his/her fellow immigrants, learn about the
eligibility rules from the large immigrant population in California and jump on Medicaid as soon
as conditions mature. In contrast, if the Filipino arrives to Alaska where there are few
immigrants, it will possibly take him/her a much longer time to learn about the welfare eligibility
rules or (s)he will never learn about them. Indeed, by using a micro sample from the Census data,
Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) find strong empirical evidence that immigrants who
have more contacts with other immigrants, especially immigrants with knowledge of welfare
programs, are much more likely to participate in welfare programs themselves. Aizer and Currie
(2003) also find that the use of publicly funded prenatal care in California is highly correlated
within race/ethnicity groups and neighborhoods (2574).
Alternatively, the size of immigrant population is also an important demographic factor
that is indicative of immigrants’ (especially Latinos’) political mobilization and their influence in
the policymaking process (Leighley 2001, Sanchez 2006). A large and strong immigrant
population can positively influence how state-level political institutions deal with immigration-
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related social policy issues. Indeed, public opinion research shows Latinos are more attentive to
immigration policies and have more liberal policy attitudes than non-Latino voters. Whether or
not immigrants’ (or Latinos’) policy preferences are reflected in the actual policy making process
depends on the level of their acculturation and how political elites respond to their policy
interests (Branton 2007). In fact, previous research shows that political elites (such as legislators)
are more likely to be responsive to immigrants’ demands in states with a large immigrant (or
Latino) population than states with a small immigrant population (Casellas 2009).
Considering that a large immigrant population will better provide a necessary social
network for immigrant welfare participation and promote immigrants’ influence on the
policymaking process, we argue that the size of the immigrant population will condition the
effect of state immigrant Medicaid policy on the foreign-native Medicaid coverage gap. A large
existing immigrant population and a large immigration influx in recent years could both alleviate
the negative impact of exclusive policies on social inequality, but a small immigrant population
can deteriorate the negative effect of exclusive policies on social inequality.
H2: The positive effect of exclusive immigrant Medicaid policies on the native-foreign disparity
in Medicaid coverage is strengthened in states with a sparser immigrant population or a slower
growth in immigration population, but attenuated in states with a denser immigrant population
or a faster growth in immigration population.

Data and Methods
We devise a cross-section-time-series design by pooling state-level data of the native-foreign
difference in Medicaid coverage and state-level immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules from 1998
to 2010.
The Native-Foreign Difference in Medicaid Coverage. We measure the native-foreign
difference in Medicaid coverage based on data from the Census Bureau’s March Current
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Population Surveys. We count the numbers of native-born and foreign-born who had Medicaid
coverage in each year and state. We then convert the raw counts into participation rates by
calculating the percentage of native-born and foreign-born enrolled in Medicaid based on their
own population size, as shown in equation (1).3

Inequality𝑖,𝑡 = (

Native Born with Medicaid𝑖,𝑡
Native Born Population𝑖,𝑡

−

Foreign Born with Medicaid𝑖,𝑡
Foreign Born Population𝑖,𝑡

) × 100

(1)

Figure 1 presents the cross-state and cross-year variation of the inequality measure.
Overall, the net-difference between native-born and foreign-born individuals’ Medicaid coverage
does not change dramatically within states, but the between-state comparison is much sharper
than within state differences. Figure 2 presents the ranking of American states based on their
mean inequality scores from 1998 to 2010. With only a few exceptions (Minnesota, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, and New York), most states have lower Medicaid coverage rates for their
foreign-born residents. Nearly half of the states have large coverage gaps between native- and
foreign-born residents that exceed 4%.
[Figure 1 About Here]
[Figure 2 About Here]
Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score. Our first key explanatory variable “Immigrant
Medicaid Eligibility Score” is an index measure of states’ immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules in
five specific areas. Specifically, we code the following five major eligibility rules for each state:
(1) whether or not states grant Medicaid coverage to pre-PRWORA immigrants (i.e. immigrants
who settled in the U.S. before August 22, 1996), (2) the availability of state funded Medicaid to
3 We focus on Medicaid for two reasons: (1) this government health insurance program is designed for eligible, nonelderly workers; (2) it is one of the major safety net programs most affected by the 1996 PRWORA.
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post-PRWORA qualified immigrants during the five-year bar of federal benefits, (3) provision of
Medicaid to post-PRWORA qualified immigrants after the five-year bar of federal benefits; (4)
provision of Medicaid to certain unqualified immigrants for non-emergency medical care; (5)
whether or not immigrants are eligible for state-only health insurance program for nonemergency medical care. A few prior studies provide snapshots of immigrants’ Medicaid
eligibilities (Bitler and Hoynes, 2013; Fortuny and Chaudry, 2011; Tumlin, Zimmermann and
Ost, 1999), but not in all the years from 1998 to 2010. Our annual eligibility score measure is a
compilation of these prior policy snapshots (Tumlin, Zimmermann and Ost, 1999) and our
originally collected policy data through email and phone surveys of the 50 state Medicaid
agencies.4 We code the first three eligibility items as “2” if all immigrants are eligible for
Medicaid coverage, “1” if some immigrants are eligible, and “0” otherwise. We code the last two
eligibility items as “1” if state-provided coverage is available to immigrants and “0” otherwise.
Because we code each eligibility item as a categorical variable, with arbitrarily assigned
values (e.g. 0, 1, 2, etc.), an additive scale will result in the first three eligibility items carrying
more weight. Moreover, in order to capture more nuanced differences in states policies, we code
the first three eligibility indicators by using a three-category ordinal scale, but the last two

4 Policy information regarding the 50 states in 1998 is collected from Tumlin, Zimmermann and Ost (1999)’s state
policy snapshots of public benefits for immigrants. Fortuny and Chaudry (2011) provide a one-year policy snapshot
for the 50 states in 2010. Bitler and Hoynes (2013) provide state Medicaid immigrant eligibility in 2002, 2004,
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 (see their Appendix Table 2). To cross validate policy information from multiple
sources and to track policy changes in years between 1998 and 2010, we conducted a structured email/phone survey
over the fifty state agencies (see Table 1). We sent email inquiries to each state agency, followed by one or multiple
phone calls if we did not receive any email response from a state agency. In our structured email/phone survey, we
asked state agencies to verify their current Medicaid immigrant eligibilities along the aforementioned five areas. We
then asked state agencies to provide information about any policy change between 1998 and 2010 ( i.e. whether
there were any changes in immigrant Medicaid eligibility between 1998 and 2010; if so, what changes and when
they took place).
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indicators are dichotomous. In other words, the five eligibility items are scaled differently, which
is a problem for generating an additive score. Therefore, we adopt the Bayesian measurement
approach developed by Kevin Quinn (2004) to deal with such mixed multivariate responses.
Compared with a simple additive scale or the standard factor analysis, Quinn’s Bayesian factor
analysis approach has two advantages. First, the Bayesian factor analytical model produces a
standardized policy index, which is converted based on the estimated factor loadings of the five
eligibility items. Such a standardized index is invariant to the varying response scales of different
eligibility items. In other words, the weight of each eligibility item in the index is defined by its
(estimated) association with the underlying latent dimension of welfare inclusion, and is not
defined by how it is coded. Second, the Bayesian approach does not estimate parameters in the
measurement model as deterministic values but instead explicitly incorporates uncertainty in all
parameters. Thus, the Bayesian approach helps to reduce measurement errors, and improves
inferences about how states with extremely exclusive and inclusive policies would be placed on
the latent scale of immigrant inclusion.
We compute the Bayesian factor index of immigrant inclusion using Kevin Quinn’s
(2004) R package MCMCpack, with 2,000 burn-in iterations and 200,000 MCMC scans after the
burn-in. The resulting Bayesian factor index of immigrant inclusion has a range from -1.08 to
1.5, with a greater value indicating more inclusive state Medicaid eligibility rules toward
immigrants.5 Figure 3 ranks the 50 states based on the mean-level of immigrant inclusion in their
Medicaid program from 1998 to 2010.
[Figure 3 About Here]

5 In the Supporting Information, we present more details on our data collection procedure for the five policy items
capturing states’ Medicaid immigrant eligibility rules. We also present the R script used to compute the Bayesian
factor index. As shown in our replication code, using Kevin Quinn’s MCMCpack in R, implementing the Bayesian
measurement model is as straightforward as implementing the standard factor analytical model.
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As Figure 3 shows, states such as Alabama, Arizona, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming
are among those that have low levels of immigrant inclusion in their Medicaid programs. These
states either do not use state funds to provide Medicaid to immigrants at all, or only provide
Medicaid to immigrants under very extreme circumstances. States such as California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington are among those that have high levels
of immigrant inclusion in their Medicaid programs. They either exempt the five-year waiting
period, or at least fund immigrants with Medicaid after the five-year bar using state funds. A few
of these states also use discretionary state funds to provide immigrants with special health
insurance programs. A handful of states changed their immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules from
1998 to 2010. For example, Colorado, Connecticut, and Maine had a high level of immigrant
inclusion in their Medicaid programs after the 1996 welfare reform, but became much more
exclusive since 2008. States such as Delaware, Hawaii, and New York followed most of the
federal restrictions in the late 1990s, but restored immigrants’ Medicaid eligibility in recent
years.
Immigrant Population Density. Our conditional independent variable immigration
population density is measured as the percentage of foreign-born population out of total
population in each state year. We have collected data from the Census Bureau Current
Population Surveys Annual Social and Economic Supplements (CPS-ASEC).
Racial/Ethnic Diversity. In our empirical models, we include the racial/ethnic diversity of
state population as a control variable. According to the “group competition and exclusion” thesis
mentioned in section 2, racial diversity triggers perceived threat and group-competition among
native-born citizens (Esses et al., 2001; Hero and Preuhs, 2007). As a consequence, native-born
citizens might demand policies that restrict immigrants’ access to public health care. Therefore,
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racial diversity is expected to be positively associated with the native-foreign difference in
Medicaid coverage. We measure racial and ethnic diversity based on the Blau Index (Blau, 1977;
Hero, 1998; Tolbert and Hero, 2001):
Diversity𝑖,𝑡 = [1 − ∑(𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 )2 ] × 100

(2)

In equation (2), i and t index a specific state-year observation, j indexes a particular racial
and ethnic group, and p denotes the proportion of group j as a share in the total population. We
accounted for five racial groups (white, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and others) and scale the
diversity measure from perfect homogeneity (0) to perfect heterogeneity (100).6
Macroeconomic Factors. We include Unemployment and Poverty7 as two
macroeconomic factors that affect government redistribution in general. Moreover, Union
Density is considered as another labor-market factor that influences state-level redistributive
politics, including inequality in health care. Considering union’s pro-immigrant attitudes in
recent history, we argue that the union should reduce social inequality between immigrants and
native-born citizens. This variable measures the percentage of wage and salary employees who
are labor union members. Data for all three socioeconomic variables are drawn from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys.
Political Contexts. We include a set of state-level political variables to control for
6 Because the Diversity index is computed by counting states’ Hispanic and Asian population, it has a positive
correlation with the Immigration variable. To make sure that our key result pertaining to Immigration is not affected
by the correlation between these two variables, we run a robustness check by replacing Diversity with % Black
Population. We obtain comparable results in models using % Black Population. Moreover, with the consideration
that different ethnic minority groups may have different preferences on social and immigration issues, we reestimate the empirical models by replacing the Diversity index by % Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations. This
alternative model specification does not alter the substantive findings regarding how Immigration and Eligibility
interactively affect the native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap. See more details in the Supporting Information.
7 Because we focus on comparing the native- and foreign-born Medicaid coverage rates, it is conceivable that the
relative poverty rates between these two groups rather than the overall poverty rates may have an impact. In the
Supporting Information, we re-estimate the empirical models using two native-foreign relative poverty measures to
replace the overall Poverty variable reported in the manuscript. The first relative poverty measure captures the net
difference between poverty rates for foreign- and native-born population. The second relative poverty measure is the
ratio of foreign-native poverty rates. Using these two relative poverty measures does not alter our key substantive
findings.
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different political contexts. First, we control for mass liberalism, because prior studies suggest
voters’ liberal-conservative orientation affects the politics of immigration (Monogan, 2013),
welfare generosity toward immigrants (Hero and Preuhs, 2007), and the overall welfare
generosity (Erikson, Wright and McIver, 1993). We expect to see a negative association between
mass liberalism and the native-foreign difference in Medicaid coverage. The Mass Liberalism
variable is the Pacheco (2011) measure of the share of voters who identify with a liberal ideology
orientation. In additional to Mass Liberalism, we also include the Berry et al. (1998) measure of
Government Liberalism in our empirical models.
Second, we control for governor’s partisanship. According to Bartels (2008), the
partisanship of political executives has an influence on inequality. More specifically, Democratic
presidents tend to prevent inequality from growing, while Republican presidents do not care
about inequality as much, and therefore, inequality levels tend to increase under Republican
presidents. Since our analysis is at the state level, we borrow Bartels’ “political executives’
partisanship and inequality” thesis, and argue that the partisanship of a political executive also
influences social inequality levels at the state level. Therefore, the gap of Medicaid coverage
between native- and foreign-born should be smaller in states with Democratic governors
compared to states with Republican governors.
Third, we include the percentage of Democrats in state legislatures. Numerous scholars
have examined the link between the partisan balance of state legislatures with welfare generosity,
and they often connect left-wing partisanship with more redistribution, because left-wing parties
mainly draw their support from the working class, who favor generous welfare spending (Hibbs,
1977; Tufte, 1980; Bradley et al., 2003; Bartels, 2008). On the other hand, right wing parties are
often times linked with low levels of support for welfare spending and high levels of inequality
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(Hibbs, 1977; Tufte, 1980; Bradley et al., 2003; Bartels, 2008). Based on this contention, we
argue that the percentage of Democrats in state legislatures is negatively associated with
inequality in health care between native- and foreign-born populations. Data on these two
variables are collected from Kapeluck and Garand (2011).8, 9
Lastly, we include a dummy variable for southern states, because southern states have
unique historical, political and cultural characteristics that differentiate them from other states
(Key, 1949). Including the southern-dummy variable also helps to control for other unobserved
policy factors, such as the emerging trend of adopting anti-immigration laws and aggressive local
immigration enforcement in southern states (Rocha et al. 2014). We expect to see southern states
to have greater social inequality.
Model Specification. Because we pooled data from fifty states and fifteen years, we
consider both cross-state heterogeneity and time dependence in the pooled CSTS analysis (Beck
and Katz, 1996; Beck, 2001). To deal with both heterogeneity and contemporaneous correlation
across states, we implemented the Panel-Corrected -Standard-Error procedure (PCSE) proposed
by Beck and Katz (1996). In addition, an AR(1) error specification is applied to the panel model
to correct for serially auto-correlated disturbance terms. Based on the analysis of residuals, we
identified a handful of state-year cases that provide unreliable data on the foreign-born Medicaid
coverage rates. When mapping these state-year cases into the CPS sample, we see that they are
all state-year cases, whereby the CPS sample suffers from small-population sampling errors for
8 Nebraska has a non-partisan state legislature, we proximate the Democratic Seat Share variable for Nebraska using
Census Bureau’s biannual data on vote cast for US Representatives by major political parties. As such, Nebraska is
not excluded from the empirical analysis.
9 Both the immigrant population density variable and the set of state-level political variables included in our model
might be correlated with state Medicaid eligibility rules for immigrants. To make sure that multicollinearity is not a
concern, we check the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics after estimating an OLS baseline model including all
the explanatory variables. We do not detect troublesome VIF statistics. The mean VIF is 2.72. The VIF statistics
associated with Immigration and Eligibility are 3.09 and 2.13, respectively. Government Liberalism is associated
with the highest VIF score, 5.82. Including and excluding Government Liberalism do not alter findings pertaining to
Immigration and Eligibility.
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the foreign-born population. We dropped these unreliable state-year cases from the empirical
models reported in the paper.10
The potential endogenous relationship between the size of the foreign-born population
and native-foreign differences in Medicaid coverage is another important issue that we are
concerned with. Prior studies have reported that immigrants tend to cluster in states with
generous welfare benefits (Borjas, Bronars and Trejo, 1992; Borjas, 1999; Frey et al., 1996),11 or
in states where their relative economic opportunity and access to welfare resources are better
(Hero, 1998). If the endogenous selection presents, the relationship between immigration and
native-foreign differences in Medicaid coverage may not be static.
Instead, there could be a long-run relationship between the two variables. With our panel
data, we do observe a weakly endogenous relationship between immigration and relative
Medicaid inclusion of immigrants. Regressing Immigrationt on Inequalityt produces a negative
and significant coefficient for Inequalityt. When regressing Immigrationt on Immigrationt-1 and
Inequalityt-1, we obtain an insignificant coefficient for Immigrationt-1. When regressing
Inequalityt on Inequalityt-1 and Immigrationt-1, we obtain a significant coefficient for
Immigrationt-1. The more complex dynamics suggest that the stock of immigrants and the level
of inequality in Medicaid coverage may share a long-run equilibrium relationship. In other
words, changes in immigration and changes in the native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap may
adjust to each other over time. Other scholars, who use alternative datasets to study immigration
and welfare provision, also find a similar dynamic relationship (Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011).
10 In the Supporting Information, we report empirical models without excluding these unreliable cases. The
robustness check demonstrates that models excluding these reliable cases produce tighter results than those based on
the full sample. Our substantive conclusions regarding the impact of immigration and states’ immigrant Medicaid
eligibility score, however, remain the same.
11 Some recent studies show that immigrants’ location choice might not just be determined by the generosity of
state welfare policies. For instance, Kaushal (2005) used the INS immigration data and found that immigrants’
access to means-tested programs (TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid) has little impact on newcomers’ location
choice.
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To depict the long-run dynamic relationship, we added an error-correction specification
in our model, following the econometric theories contributed by Engle and Granger (1991) and
Banerjee et al. (1999). For the sake of parsimony, we specified the generalized one-step error
correction model (De Boef, 2001; De Boef and Keele, 2008). The dynamic component is written
as equation (3), in which i and t index state and year; β denotes the vector of coefficients
corresponding to all the control variables; and X denotes the vector of control variables. In the
subsequent section, we report both the static and dynamic models and discuss our key findings
primarily based on the error correction model.
∆ Inequality𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 Inequality𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 Immigration𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 ∆Immigration𝑖,𝑡
+𝛼4 Eligibility𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5 Immigration𝑖,𝑡−1 × Eligibility𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6 ∆Immigration𝑖,𝑡 × Eligibility𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(3)

Findings
Table 1 reports our main statistical results. Model (1) in Table 1 shows the static interaction
model. Model (2) in Table 1 presents findings based on the error-correction specification.
Despite the biased estimations in Model (1), both models report consistent signs of all
explanatory variables. In both models, the linear term of Eligibilityt, Immigrant Medicaid
Eligibility Score has a negative and significant coefficient (b= -2.116, SE=0.510 in Model (1); b=
-1.273, SE= 0.365 in Model (2)). The interaction terms in both models are positive and
significant. Overall, we find support for the hypotheses that immigrant population density and
states’ immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules interactively shape the native-foreign Medicaid
coverage gap. 12

12 In our empirical analysis, we group foreign-born naturalized citizens and foreign-born non-citizens into one
category and compare their Medicaid coverage with native-born citizens. Because both citizenship status and
nativity may shape the political exclusion of immigrants, we analyze two additional “gap” measures--the Medicaid
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[Table 1 About Here]
The significant coefficients in both Models (1) and (2) mean that the effect of states’
immigrant eligibility policies is conditional upon the immigrant population density within that
state. Because coefficients in an interaction model are difficult for direct interpretation, we use
Figure 4 to show the marginal effects of Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score conditional upon
the two immigration variables (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Since the error-correction
model is more appropriate than the static model in depicting the relationship between state
policy, immigrant population density and inequality in Medicaid coverage, we generate Figure 4
based on Model (2).
[Figure 4 About Here]
Figure 4a shows the marginal effect of Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score conditional
upon the immigrant population density in the previous year. We observe that in states with
sparser immigrant populations, state Medicaid eligibility restrictions have negative and
significant marginal effects on the native-foreign difference in Medicaid coverage. This negative
marginal effect, however, is attenuated as the immigrant population density increases and cannot
be statistically differentiated from zero in states with a very dense immigrant population
(approximately, Immigrationt-1 ≥ 20%).13 Figure 4b shows a consistent pattern that the effect of

coverage gap between citizens and non-citizens, and the Medicaid coverage gap between native-born citizens and
naturalized citizens. The comparison between native-born citizens and naturalized citizens would be a stricter test of
our hypotheses, because naturalized citizens enjoy the similar citizen privilege as native-born citizens under
PRWORA. Using these two alternative “gap” measures, we still reach similar substantive conclusions. We report
these additional analyses in the Supporting Information. Ideally, we would also like to analyze Medicaid coverage
rates for undocumented immigrants. To do so, we not only need reliable state-level estimation of the undocumented
immigrant population, but also need individual-level records for how many undocumented immigrants are enrolled
in Medicaid. The CPS data we use in this paper does not provide information on immigrants’ legal status, therefore,
we cannot separate undocumented immigrants from other immigrants in our analysis.
13
Our data show that states such as California, New York and New Jersey (2005-2010) have more than 20%
foreign-born population and quite inclusive immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules; states such as Florida (2004-2010)
and Nevada (2007-2010) have large stocks of foreign-born population (>20%) and quite exclusive immigrant
Medicaid eligibility rules. Since our data on foreign-born population are estimations based on the Current
Population Surveys Annual Social and Economic Supplements, it is possible that foreign-born population estimation
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Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score is conditional upon the annual change of states’ immigrant
population density. The negative effect of Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score is strengthened
in states that experienced decreases in foreign-born population density; yet, it is attenuated in
states with a large increase in foreign-born population density. The marginal effect of state
policies is not statistically differentiable from zero in states with a large influx of foreign-born
population (approximately, ∆Immigrationt ≥ 2%). These findings, taken together, support H2.
The conditional hypothesis also implies a symmetric nature of the posited interaction
relationship–when the effect of Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score on native-foreign Medicaid
coverage gap is conditional upon immigrant population density, the effect of immigrant
population density must be conditional upon the value of Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score
(Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012). Therefore, to gauge empirical evidence for H2, we further
examine whether both the short-run and long-run effects of immigration differ across the value
of Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
[Figure 5 About Here]
In equation (3), the coefficient of Immigrationt-1 (α2) represents the immediate changes in
inequality associated with a one-unit change in immigration in year t-1, when Immigrant
Medicaid Eligibility Score equals zero. The coefficient for Immigrationt-1 × Eligibility, α5,
represents how the immediate impact of Immigrationt-1 is conditional upon Immigrant Medicaid
Eligibility Score. We substantively illustrate this conditional effect in Figure 5a. This interaction
figure is generated for two different policy scenarios: exclusive and inclusive state Medicaid
policy, by setting Eligibilityt at its 10th (exclusive states) and 90th (inclusive states) percentiles.
We use the Clarify program (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003) to simulate the mean predicted
based on other survey samples could be slightly different from ours. For example, using survey samples from the
American Community Survey (ACS), the Pew Research Center estimated that, in 2012, the foreign-born population
in Florida and Nevada was around 19% and 19.5%, respectively.
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changes in the native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap across the full range of values observed for
Immigrationt-1, holding all the other control variables constant. Figure 5a shows that the effect of
Immigrationt−1 differs in states with inclusive and exclusive Medicaid policies. When the
percentage of foreign-born population is between 0% and 11% in the previous year, predicted
changes in the native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap is always positive in exclusive states, but
equal to zero in inclusive states. Overall, when the immigrant population density is high,
immigration is associated with diminishing inequality.
Using the same method, Figure 5b shows the predicted changes in inequality along the
full range of ∆Immigrationt, in exclusive and inclusive states. This conditional short-run effect of
∆Immigrationt is reflected by α3 and α6 in equation (3). In Figure 5b, we observe a negative and
significant relationship between ∆Inequalityt and ∆Immigrationt in states with exclusive
immigrant Medicaid eligibility policies, but not in states with inclusive policies. Figure 5
provides consistent evidence supporting H2.
The error-correction model also specifies a long-run equilibrium relationship between
immigration and inequality, conditional upon states’ Medicaid policies. This long-run
relationship means that an increase in immigration disrupts the underlying equilibrium, causing
inequality to be too high. Therefore, when Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score equals zero, the
𝛼

inequality measure will respond by decreasing a total of 0.262 points (i.e. −𝛼2 , see De Boef and
1

Keele (2008)), spread over future time periods at a rate of 61.4% (i.e. α1) per time period. Further
considering the conditional nature of the long-run effect, we use Figure 6 to compare the
simulated long-run effect of immigration in exclusive and inclusive states, and how that long-run
effect is distributed across future time periods.14

14 Similar to Figure 5, we also use the Clarify program in STATA12 to simulate the conditional long-run effect of
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[Figure 6 About Here]
We observe different long-run effects of immigration conditional upon the value of
Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score. When Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score is low
(exclusive policies), the estimated total long-run effect of immigration is approximately -0.334.
This long-run effect is statistically differentiable from zero (shown in Figure 6a), and distributed
across subsequent four years at a rate of 61.4% per year. This means that a 1% increase in
foreign-born population leads inequality to decrease a total of 0.334 points in a five-year period.
When Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score is high, however, the mean estimated total long-run
effect of immigration becomes much smaller (approximately -0.129), but its 95% confidence
intervals overlap with zero. It is only distributed through the subsequent two years. We observe
different long-run dynamics in exclusive and inclusive states, which provides additional support
for H2.
Results on the socioeconomic variables show the expected relationships. Both
racial/ethnic diversity of the state population and poverty are positively associated with the
native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap. Union density, however, is found to be negatively
associated with the dependent variable. In addition, inequality in Medicaid coverage is lower in
states with more Democratic legislators.
To summarize, our empirical findings underpin the interactive relationship between
immigration and states’ immigrant Medicaid eligibility policies. Exclusive state Medicaid
policies widen the participation gap between the native- and foreign-born populations. Immigrant
population, as an important state context, can change dynamically. It does not just condition the
effect of state policy in a static way. In both the short- and long-run, the two factors have a

immigration.
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salient combined effect on the native-foreign Medicaid coverage gap. In states with exclusive
Medicaid policies and a small immigrant population, immigration leads to increases in the
participation gap. In states with inclusive Medicaid policy and a small immigrant population,
immigration does not lead to future changes in the participation gap. In states with a large
immigrant population, immigration leads to decreases in social inequality no matter what the
state Medicaid policy is.

Concluding Discussions
In this paper, we examine the relationship between state immigrant welfare policy, immigrant
population density, and the native-foreign disparity in Medicaid coverage. This project
contributes to previous literature in two important ways. Firstly, for the first time we have
collected original data on state immigrant Medicaid eligibility rules across 50 states and over 13
years. Secondly, we have extended the literature on immigration and welfare provision by
exploring a more complex relationship between state policies, immigration and the relative
wellbeing of immigrants. We maintain that state policies, which include or exclude certain
groups’ social rights, are crucial determinants of the relative wellbeing of these groups.
In this paper, we develop two hypotheses based on the theories of the politics of welfare
exclusion and social networks. Our first hypothesis centers on the political exclusion argument,
and remains that while exclusive immigrant welfare policy leaves immigrants behind, inclusive
immigrant welfare policy could reduce health care disparities. Our second hypothesis further
posits a more complex relationship regarding how immigrant population density conditions the
effect of state Medicaid policies on social inequality between immigrants and native-born
residents. The results of our dynamic model lend support to both hypotheses. The state
immigrant Medicaid eligibility score has a negative marginal effect on native-foreign Medicaid
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coverage gap in states with a low or moderate level of immigrant population density. The nativeforeign participation gap is the highest in states with both exclusive immigrant welfare policies
and sparse immigrant populations. Moreover, immigration density and states’ decisive policy
choices interactively determine how Medicaid coverage is distributed among native-born and
foreign-born residents. The interactive effects are seen both in the short-run and in the long-run.
On the one hand, the marginal effect of state immigrant Medicaid eligibility score is conditional
upon the size of foreign-born population in that state. On the other hand, state Medicaid
eligibilities matter substantially in conditioning the effect of immigration from both the shortand long-run.
Although our findings suggest that the size of states’ immigrant population has a
measurable impact on immigrants’ relative access to Medicaid, we admit that it is neither the
only nor the perfect measure for the strength of immigrants’ social networks. As some recent
studies show, in-group heterogeneity based on immigrants’ country of origin or legal status (e.g.
citizens vs. noncitizens, immigrant workers vs. refugees/asylees, etc.) (Rocha and Matsubayashi
2014) as well as the residential segregation between immigrants and citizens (Rocha and Espino
2010), may be other important contextual factors that could shape the strength of immigrants’
social networks and condition the relationship between state policies and social inequality. A
natural extension of our research would be to further explore alternative approaches to
operationalize the concept of immigrant social network along these lines.
Our research shows that states are important stakeholders when it comes to health care
equality. As the Supreme Court has upheld the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010, states will again be considered as pivotal stakeholders for policy implementation of health
care reform in the near future. How could the American health care system be transformed to
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better incorporate its newcomers? Perhaps, the answer is more about bottom-up reforms from the
states and less about the polarized political struggle at the national level.
To conclude, focusing on the social inequality aspect, we have explored the intersection
of two problematic domains of the American democracy–immigration and health care. Our
findings point toward a more complex relationship between immigration and social inequality in
public health care provision. We show that the vulnerable group’s (immigrants) relative
wellbeing in a plural society hinges on a complex set of factors including its own group size,
policy setups that define who are the “deserving” constituents, and the connection between
socio-economic and political factors. Although providing everyone who is pursuing the
“American dream” in the United States equal access to health care remains to be an “American
struggle,” the state-level picture presented here seems to shed some light on a future promise. So
far, about half of the states have provided solely state funded health coverage to foreign-born
residents and different strategies have been used to reduce eligibility restrictions to immigrants’
access to health care. These inclusive policies help close the health care coverage gap between
vulnerable immigrants and their citizen counterparts. Surprisingly, our research is one of the few
systematic studies examining state-level immigrant welfare eligibility rules and its effect on
social outcomes over time. Of course, Medicaid is only one of many welfare programs that are
co-sponsored by the federal and state governments. Given that such policies have important
implications on social equity in relation to over 40 million immigrants in the United States,
scholars are encouraged to explore various state-level immigrant welfare policies, as well as their
social and political implications on the quality of American democracy.
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Table 1: Determinants of Inequality in Medicaid Coverage Rates between Native- and ForeignBorn Populations
(1) Static
(2) ECM
DV: ∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
DV: ∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
Variable
(PCSE) Coefficient
(PCSE)
Coefficient
Immigrationt
-0.226**
(0.053) --Eligibilityt
-2.116**
(0.510) -1.273**
(0.365)
Immigrationt X Eligibilityt
0.095**
(0.032) -Inequalityt-1
---0.614**
(0.081)
Immigrationt-1
---0.161**
(0.041)
---0.192
(0.140)
∆ Immigration
Immigrationt-1 X Eligibilityt --0.051*
(0.022)
-0.341*
(0.165)
∆ Immigration X Eligibilityt -Ethnic Diversity
8.572**
(2.226) 6.432**
(1.519)
Union Density
-0.150**
(0.050) -0.099**
(0.033)
Unemployment
0.162**
(0.067) 0.066
(0.051)
Poverty
0.292**
(0.081) 0.182**
(0.070)
Mass Liberalism
-9.599
(7.166) -5.49
(5.835)
Government Liberalism
0.037**
(0.015) 0.028*
(0.012)
Democratic Seat Share
-5.623**
(1.986) -3.896**
(1.573)
Democratic Governor
-0.429
(0.597) -0.282
(0.503)
Southern States
0.015
(0.539) 0.299
(0.376)
Intercept
3.634*
(1.749) 2.210
(1.533)
N
594
557
R2
0.301
0.335
0.316
-𝜌
Significance levels: *: 5%, ** : 1%.

Figure 1: Inequality in Medicaid Coverage between Foreign and Native Born Populations in 50
States, 1998-2010
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Figure 2: Ranking Fifty States based on the Mean Inequality Score (Average Net Difference in
Medicaid Coverage Rates between Foreign and Native Born Populations from 1998 to 2010)
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Figure 3: Ranking Fifty States based on the Mean Level of Immigrant Inclusiveness in Medicaid
(Average Immigrant Medicaid Eligibility Score from 1998 to 2010)
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Figure 4: Comparing the Marginal Effect of State Policy Conditional Upon Immigration
Population Density

(a) The Marginal Effect of Immigrant
Medicaid Eligibility Score Conditional
Upon Immingrationt-1

(b) The Marginal Effect of Immigrant
Medicaid Eligibility Score Conditional
Upon ∆ Immigration
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Figure 5: Comparing the Short-Run Effects of Immigration on Medicaid Coverage Gap between
Native- and Foreign-Born Population in States with Inclusive and Exclusive Medicaid Policies

(a) The Immediate Changes in Inequality
Associated with Immingrationt-1

(b) The Immediate Changes in Inequality
Associated with ∆ Immigration
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Figure 6: Comparing the Long-Run Effects of Immigration on Medicaid Coverage Gap between
Native- and Foreign-Born Population in States with Inclusive and Exclusive Medicaid Policies

(a) Estimated Long-Run Effects

(b) Estimated Lag Distributions of the Impact of
Immigration
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